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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
CCD, L.C., a Utah limited liability 
company, d/b/a/ UNITED TITLE 
SERVICES OF SOUTHERN UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
CHRISTOPHER LYNN MILLSAP, an 
individual, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 20020875-SC 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appellant, Christopher Lynn Millsap ("Millsap"), by and through his attorneys, 
hereby replies to the Brief of Appellee CCD ("CCD Brief), filed with this Court on 
September 9, 2003. Using Millsap's initial Brief of Appellant as an organizational guide 
to the arguments before this Court, Millsap submits the following. In doing so, Millsap 
reasserts the points and authorities presented in the initial brief and does not waive any 
arguments set forth therein. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN INTERPRETING 
THE UTAH REVISED LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY 
ACT IN EXPELLING MILLSAP. 
In its response, Appellee CCD ("CCD") argues that the trial court correctly 
interpreted the Utah Revised Limited Liability Act ("the Act"), and more specifically 
Utah Code Ann.§ 48-2c-710 ("the expulsion provision"), in expelling Millsap as a 
Member of CCD. See CCD Brief at 31. As support, CCD reasons that: 1) principles of 
statutory construction and legislative intent authorize CCD to expel Millsap under the 
facts of this case, see id. at 31-39; 2) the "timing" of Millsap's retirement and CCD's 
filing for expulsion is irrelevant, see id. at 40-41; and 3) the Act's expulsion provision 
trumped CCD's operating agreement, see id. at 42-43. For the following reasons, CCD's 
arguments should be rejected and this Court should find that because Millsap was not a 
"member"of CCD at the time of the judicial determination of expulsion, Millsap could 
not be "expelled" within the meaning of the Act. 
A. Principles Of Statutory Construction Do Not 
Authorize Expulsion In This Case Under 
The Plain Language Of The Act. 
Foundational principles of statutory construction do not authorize CCD to expel 
Millsap under the facts of this case. Here, CCD wishes to ignore the plain language of the 
expulsion provision. Indeed, CCD relies on the proposition that "when doubt or 
uncertainty exists as to the meaning or application of an act's provisions," then an 
statute is analyzed in accordance with legislative intent. See CCD Brief at 32 (emphasis 
added). In doing so, CCD contends that Millsap's reading of the statute is "hyper-
technical" and will result in an interpretation that contradicts the express purpose of 
legislature. See id. at 32-33. 
However, Millsap's reading of the expulsion provision is not "hyper-technical," 
nor is the expulsion provision ambiguous.1 In fact, the expulsion provision could not be 
'Instead, this Court "must assume that each term in the statute was used advisedly" 
and as such, "the statutory words are read literally, unless such a reading is unreasonably 
confused or inoperable." See Atlas Steel, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Com 'n, 61 P.3d 1053, 
1058 (Utah 2002); State v. Bluff, 52 P.3d 1210, 1221 (Utah 2002); Davis County v. Zions 
First Natl Bank, 51 P.3d 718, 721 (Utah App. 2002). Nor may a court "rewrite the 
statute to conform to an intention not expressed." American Fork City v. Pena-Flores, 63 
2 
clearer-"a member of a company inu> be expelled upon n t IMIII i iiuiin, utnl t, niiili linns. 
S*-i •: — ^ emphasis added). As noted by CCD, the term 
"member" means a 'pervi: •. i-. ^ -^  -icrship interest in a. company and with the rights 
and uoiigduuiib bpeciiieu uiiuLi liiC cnapter. ; „ .. :i - n. 
§4K V 111 M I 11 I IMM r\ n u hen i in r on retires, not only do they not retain all the rights 
and obligations specified under the chaotc: ""/ indor a* ^ ther specific provision of the 
Act, they statutorily cease IK;!^ an i .mu. \ . 
th.il membership i e,isesM upuii \ nlimtan withdrawal).2 
Moreover, despite CClVs contention, the framework of the Act does provide when 
"expulsion" becomes ettective. set . . . 3 :'L Again., ( '< "I> ignoies Hie plain 
j
 i n ; : r J : / . i o l l l c l i e d b U l l s iisteci for expulsion, provides thai *" a: 
mem her of a comnam max oe expellu ^plication by the company or aiv-1 ." 
menibci. bv judicial deterniinatioii Until Hit immbi'i engaged in spa ilu eniinu'ialrd 
iirt 1M i i lt;ih i I nl( \ mi iv; -4H ?r . ' K M ' ) , While an application to the court must 
iniliatr the expulsion proceeding il is "b) judicial determination" that expulsion 
becomes etiectivi1. Along vwdi llus plain reading ul Ilu uLiliiiik .inipli puluy 
considerations - ' 4 •* *^?rprelation requiring a judicial determination to 
effectuate expulsion since, if an individual ' 'n leed not acting wrongfully, partners 
P 3d 675, 683 (I Jtal i 20C 2) ( . • 
2See QJM, Grynberg v. Questar Pipeline Co., "70 F nl , ^ (1 hah 2003); Sail lake 
City v. Roberts, 44 P.3d 767, 7"2 (Utah 2002); and Utah State Bat v Summerhavvs d 
Hayden, 905 P.2d 867, 871 (Utah 1995), for the proposition that when particular w-ma; 
are defined by statute, the statute should be construed rverr^rv: ^ tU'kt ^ r " " ^ -»•• 
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acting in bad-faith should not be allowed to simply cut off a member's rights by mere 
application.3 
B. Expulsion Does Not Occur Automatically 
At The Moment Of A Wrongdoing. 
CCD further argues that Millsap "quibbles" with the trial court's oral finding that 
expulsion became effective the moment Millsap committed his wrongful acts. See CCD 
Brief at 40. In a footnote, CCD speculates that what the trial court "probably intended" is 
that Millsap lost his right to enforce the terms of the Operating Agreement and 
Amendment immediately upon commission of wrongful acts. See CCD Brief at 40, n.5. 
Under either scenario, CCD assumes that "expulsion" or the "losing of the right to 
enforce a contract" occurs instantaneously and is self-activating without any, or despite 
any, action by another. Such assumption is simply not true. For example, upon Millsap's 
wrongdoing, an act for "expulsion" had to be initiated by someone-either the Members 
saying "you are expelled," or the Members applying for a judicial determination. 
Further, CCD's theory that one is expelled or loses the right to enforce a contract 
the moment a wrongdoing occurs is not practical. While it might seem equitable in this 
case due to the nature and scope Millsap's admitted criminal wrongdoing, the general and 
overbroad proposition is an invitation for constant battle between members, with courts 
left to sort out the effect of one member proclaiming to the other that they are expelled. 
Indeed, there needs to be some independent determination or action in order to decide 
what remedy the wrongdoing warrants and what rights, if any, are lost. 
3See further discussion in Subsection D below. 
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( 
1 •- i ics. For example, Millsap may have certainly lost his right to enforce the 
Operating Agreement if the other Members had suggested they would no longer continue 
with the contract based upon 111 i llsjp vuongdomi.' HMU", I lli. I\I nil IT, Ji.f>.< I. 
' * iual relations with Millsap despite his misappropriation. Consequent!) , 
\!«. J} - sn-calied automatic loss of enforcement right, as CCD argues, was negated by 
an iei ids. 
C. The Trial Court's Ruling And CCD's Interpretation 
Of The Act Is Contrary To Expressed Legislative Intent. 
"contract a\\a>"" ihc right t< expel. Set Brief of Appellant at " IK \ 24 i citing I tah Code 
Ann §48-2c-120(f)). Millsap has asserted, however, u^i iiiv uiu. cOui; ^ idling regarding 
!h • I mi in U P o t ' l l i f r \ |) 11 III", in o n "ir , n i i l i . i i ' ' In I I m s I ' i U r e ' u i a i 
the Act "be interpreted so as to give the maximum, effect to the principle of freedom of 
contract and to the enforceability of operating agreements of ccmpai.., > n;u 
M V - • • •* )• 
While the provision of the CCD Operating Agreement precluding expulsion is i lot 
strictly enforceable, it is evidence ol the intent ul Ihe diiillei* nl Ihc dwuitnuil, .unl \\ In n 
ir.nl in 'Vinbiiulinii \" ilh ihr « nliir Operating -\i:roemrnt, there can be no argument 
regarding the intentions and effect of the agreement. The d» 'cument prov ides ' \ *- u u* 
of tl le agreement rendu.^ I,,v w^-^.^i , •„ .;. Jie compam : 
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see Operating Agreement at % 7(e); 2) Regardless of any breach, a member is empowered 
to retire at any time for any reason, see Operating Agreement at TJ12 ; and 3) upon 
retirement, a Member is to be paid for his share, with payments allowed over a period of 
20 years, regardless of the effect on the company and regardless of any prior breach of the 
agreement, see Operating Agreement at \ \ 12-14. 
The issues now before this Court concern both legislative as well as member 
intent. The legislature clearly gave the Members of CCD the freedom to structure the 
company in the manner that they seemed appropriate. The legislature has also mandated 
that the Member's intent, as reflected in the Operating Agreement, be given the maximum 
effect by this Court. The trial court ruling simply ignores the clear intentions of the 
drafting Members and eviscerates the freedom to contract and deal with problems 
internally. 
Moreover, despite Millsap's view that the Act is clear and the plain language of 
the expulsion provision takes precedence, CCD continues to assert that the intent of the 
legislature could never be to allow a person who committed the wrongdoing Millsap 
admittedly did to retain rights as a member. See CCD Brief at 38-39. In doing so, CCD 
and its Members continually point out that Millsap misappropriated a large sum of money 
from the company. See e.g., CCD Brief at 21, 23, 28, 36. CCD argues that it must have 
been the intent of the legislature, upon such wrongdoing, to immediately nullify any 
ownership rights Millsap had in the corporation he helped build and make successful. See 
CCD Brief at 37. CCD then runs this Court through a "parade of horribles" if Millsap's 
argument is accepted and states: 
6 
If Millsap's argument is accepted, any member whose acts 
constitute grounds for expulsion under the Act could avoid 
the remedy by voluntarily withdrawing to escape being 
relegated to the status of an assignee.. .Interpreting the Act in 
such a way that allows a member's alleged voluntary 
retirement to trump a company's right to seek expulsion guts 
Section 48-2c-710, making the right to expel a member 
meaningless. 
CCD Brief at 38-39. 
To the contrary, members forming an LLC have the ability to structure their 
company in a way that eliminates every result presented by this case or the imagination of 
counsel for the Plaintiff. CCD's drafters chose to take a specific route in their dealings 
with one another, and if we are to give deference to "member intent" as well as the 
"legislative intent," then the intent as expressed in the CCD Operating Agreement cannot 
be ignored. The "parade of horribles" CCD sets forth is easily remedied through 
operating agreements, and CCD's predicted results are easily avoided by drafting an 
operating agreement that does not provide a right to retire4 or one which gives members 
the ability to expel a breaching member by a majority vote.5 Although CCD claims that 
Millsap's interpretation "guts" the expulsion provision, the opposite is true: CCD's 
interpretation guts the whole intent of the Act to allow freedom of contract. 
Beyond that, if this Court orders that both the intention of the drafters as well as 
4Since, if there is no specified right to retire in an operating agreement, the default 
provision of the Act is enforced which provides that a member may not voluntarily 
withdraw absent the approval of the other members. See Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-709. 
5Since the expulsion provision also provides that a member of a company may be 
expelled "as provided in the company's operating agreement." Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-
710(1). 
7 
the legislature be followed, no unfair result will follow. Millsap has never argued that he 
is not responsible for any damage caused to CCD. But, despite the persistence of CCD, 
the damage to the company is not what is at issue before this Court. The issue is whether 
Millsap retains his profit share rights to the company. Any damage to CCD or its 
Members will appropriately be subtracted from Millsap's share of the company and CCD 
will absolutely be compensated. 
D. The Expulsion Provision Should Not 
Be Wielded In Bad Faith. 
Millsap has shown that CCD now seeks expulsion in bad faith in order to eliminate 
his profit share and to increase the profit share of the remaining two CCD Members. See 
Brief of Appellant at 10-11, 26-28. CCD counters that such is not the case. See CCD 
Brief at 45-48. The chronology of this case reveals differently. 
Upon Millsap's acknowledgment of misappropriation of funds, a new agreement 
was created which provided that Newman would lend Millsap $493,965. As security, 
Millsap granted Newman all of his interest in CCD. Millsap worked diligently and the 
money was repaid in a timely fashion. 
In October of 2000, after the money was repaid, there were only three people that 
were aware of Millsap's defalcation-the three Members of CCD. Perhaps most 
importantly, all had agreed that law enforcement would not be told of the clearly 
criminal acts by Millsap. On October 25, 2000, a special meeting was held to determine 
what Millsap would be paid for his share of the company. The minutes acknowledge that 
a "quiet parting of ways" was discussed. CCD feigns indignation at the assertion that this 
8 
discussion involved a threat that if Millsap did not agree to leave his share of the 
company behind for a nominal fee, then the parting of ways would be anything but quiet 
and authorities would be notified. CCD offers no explanation for why this "parting of 
ways" would otherwise need to be quiet. CCD offers no rebuttal to the fact that Millsap 
did not sell his interest and instead walked into the authorities on his own accord two 
months after the meeting. There is simply nothing else that "a quiet parting of ways" 
could mean in this context, and the record reveals that the other Members did threaten 
Millsap and Millsap called their bluff. 
During the next year there was absolutely no attempt to expel Millsap. Eleven 
months later in September of 2001, all of the conditions precedent to Millsap's 
reinstatement as a Member of CCD had occurred. Notably, Millsap had not been 
physically present at the business and had not requested anything from the company for at 
least a year. However, in anticipation of his retirement as a Member of CCD, and also in 
anticipation to the end of the one year waiting period required for the reinstatement of his 
rights, Millsap sent correspondence to the company requesting an appraisal of his interest 
in CCD. Immediately thereafter, CCD raced to the courthouse and filed a complaint 
against Millsap, including a claim for Millsap's expulsion from the company. Such 
expulsion would effectively cut off Millsap's profit-share interest in the company which 
he has a right to in retirement. 
CCD asserts that what it and its Members are simply doing is trying to save the 
company and prohibit Millsap's continued participation in CCD's business. See CCD 
Brief at 48. To the contrary, if that had been the true motive, such action for expulsion 
9 
would have occurred when Millsap was actually present and involved in the daily affairs 
of the company. The reality of the situation is that CCD and its Members attempted on 
two prior occasions to obtain Millsap's share of the company. First, the Members set up 
the amended agreement so that if Millsap did not immediately repay the funds he 
misused, he would lose his interest in the company. When he surprisingly met those 
conditions, CCD and its Members had to find another way to shut Millsap out. Second, 
the Members attempted to coerce Millsap into leaving through threats of reporting him to 
authorities. Again, he foiled the Members' plan and reported himself. 
Subsequently, on September 28, 2002, after Millsap notified the other Members 
that he intended to retire, CCD found another way to obtain his rights and filed a 
complaint for expulsion. This Court, however, should not allow the expulsion provision 
to be used in such a manner. 
E. CCD Distorts The Underlying Financial 
Realities Of The Case. 
In their response to this Court and in argument to the trial court, CCD argues the 
perceived injustice of not expelling a member that has committed serious violations of 
law. There is, however, no actual injustice and CCD's arguments are premised upon a 
distorted version of the financial realities of this case. 
First, CCD asserts that Millsap seeks to destroy the company and dissolve it. See 
CCD Brief at 39, 48. While Millsap does seek proper compensation for his interest in the 
company, the Operating Agreement provides that such compensation may be paid "in 
annual installments for a period of not less than five years nor greater than twenty years 
10 
or upon such other terms and conditions as are mutually acceptable to the parties or their 
representatives." See Operating Agreement, |^ 15. Millsap's interest can be purchased by 
either the company or the remaining Members. See id. at Tf 12. Therefore, CCD or any of 
its Members will have at least twenty years to pay for Millsap's interest, and possibly 
more through a negotiated agreement. Such clearly does not require dissolution. 
Further, insofar as Millsap's misappropriation has harmed CCD, Millsap is 
undeniably obligated to pay for what that wrongful conduct caused. However, the 
characterization that CCD would be automatically dissolved and destroyed is simply 
misleading. In reality, rather than seeking a windfall, Millsap is merely seeking 
compensation for what his share of the company is worth minus any damage he caused. 
CCD additionally maintains that Millsap, as an assignee, has not lost any financial 
share of the company. CCD reasons that Millsap's expulsion does not provide any 
financial benefit to the other Members because he still owns one-third of the company as 
an assignee. See CCD Brief at 46. The reality is that as an assignee, Millsap is only 
entitled to profit distributions "to the extent assigned" by the members. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 48-2c-l 102. For all practical purposes, the other members have the ability to 
continue making distributions to themselves as "salary" rather than "profit" in order to 
shut the assignee completely out. As such, "expulsion" does more than prevent Millsap's 
participation in the business, it effectively eliminates his right to a profit share in the 
business. Indeed, if CCD and its Members were acting in good faith, why do they need 
"expulsion" if he has already been gone for a year and has not participated in the 
management of the company? 
11 
Finally, CCD argues that if Millsap is not expelled, he is escaping responsibility 
for his thefts. Both the Operating Agreement and the order of restitution of the criminal 
court hold him fully accountable for what his actions cost the company. See Operating 
Agreement at \ 7(e). The question is not whether he should pay for his breach, but rather, 
what happens to his profit share of the company after his breach is deducted? Stated 
another way, did Millsap lose his right to that remainder as a result of his wrongful 
conduct? The unambiguous answer to that question is found in the terms of the Operating 
Agreement, and the answer is no. 
II. CCD AND ITS MEMBERS WAIVED ANY RIGHT TO 
EXPEL MILLSAP AND REFUSE PERFORMANCE OF 
THE OPERATING AGREEMENT AND AMENDMENT. 
A. CCD Waived Any Right To Expel. 
CCD never disputes the general proposition that a corporation may waive the right 
to expel. See Brief of Appellant at 29. Instead, CCD asserts that it did not intentionally 
waive its expulsion right. See CCD Brief at 28. CCD admits that even though Millsap 
committed wrongdoing, he was given a second chance. See id. CCD goes on to explain, 
however, that Millsap again wronged the corporation, and upon that discovery, Millsap 
was terminated (but not expelled) from the company. See id. at 28, 30-31. Termination, 
as opposed to expulsion, was a clear and knowing choice made by CCD and its Members. 
Importantly, it was not until September 28, 2001, over one year later at a time where 
Millsap had since repaid all monies, had taken criminal responsibility for his wrongs, had 
met the three material conditions in fulfilling the amendment to the Operating Agreement, 
and had given notice of his intent to voluntarily withdraw from the company, that CCD 
12 
then sought expulsion in an effort to cut Millsap off from any remaining rights he held in 
the corporation. Despite CCD's contentions, CCD had the option to seek expulsion at 
several points throughout this scenario. Instead of doing so, CCD knowingly allowed 
Millsap to remedy his wrongdoing through other means-namely entering into the 
amended agreement, his termination from the company, and his absolute and rapid 
repayment of misused funds. Only when Millsap did everything asked of him did CCD 
then seek expulsion. Millsap maintains, however, that expulsion at this point is simply too 
late. 
B. CCD Waived Its Right To Refuse Performance 
Based On The "First Breach Rule." 
1. Millsap has the right to enforce the terms of the 
Operating Agreement and the Amendment. 
CCD continues to argue that the trial court made findings that Millsap breached 
both the Operating Agreement and the Amendment to the Operating Agreement. See 
CCD Brief at 20. More specifically, the written findings adopted from those prepared by 
CCD state that Millsap's endorsing of checks drawn upon the trust account constituted a 
breach of the amendment. See R. 589 (finding of fact ^ 5).6 Accordingly, CCD maintains 
that Millsap's continued use of the trust account constituted material breaches of the 
Amendment, and thus, Millsap had no right of retirement. See CCD Brief at 21-24. 
6CCD misstates the trial court's written finding as "Millsap's manipulations of the 
Trust account for his personal use after the Amendment was signed constituted material 
breaches of the Amended Operating Agreement that materially and adversely affected 
CCD." CCD Brief at 20. 
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CCD also asserts that Millsap "attempts to manufacture" an issue of fact regarding 
the breach of the Amendment when Millsap presented an additional affidavit to the trial 
court7 indicating the Members knew that Millsap continued to endorse checks on the 
account and that the practicalities of the business required it. See CCD Brief at 20, 24-27. 
For the following reasons, CCD errs. 
a. Millsap has not "manufactured facts" 
and the supplemental affidavit was 
properly presented to the trial court. 
As noted in initial briefing, the finding of a material breach of the Amendment to 
the Operating Agreement does not comport with the oral ruling of the district court nor 
the court's reasoning during the hearing on the motion. See Brief of Appellant at 35. After 
receiving CCD's proposed findings, Millsap timely objected, moved the district court to 
reconsider its ruling, requested further hearing, and provided a supplemental affidavit in 
order to meet the proposed finding regarding the alleged breach of the amendment that 
seemingly came from nowhere. See R. 522-533. This "motion to reconsider" and 
supplemental affidavit were submitted prior to any signing of a final order, and therefore, 
such submission was entirely proper. See State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 
1978) (ff[T]he law is well settled in the state that the statements made by a trial judge are 
not the judgment of the case and it is only the signed judgment that prevails"). 
Importantly, "[t]rial courts have clear discretion to reconsider and change their 
position with respect to any orders or decisions as long as no final judgment has been 
7At no time during district court proceedings did CCD move to strike the affidavit. 
14 
rendered." Brookside Mobile Home Park Ltd. v. Peebles, 48 P.3d 968, 973. (Utah 2002). 
Thus, such submissions made by Millsap were appropriate since Millsap was faced with a 
proposed finding drafted by CCD which did not comport with the trial court's analysis, 
and Millsap wished to provide additional evidence surrounding that proposed finding 
since such issue had not been adequately argued. See e.g., Ron Shepherd Insurance, Inc., 
v Shields, 882 P.2d 650, 653 n.4 (Utah 1994) (where judge never signed order granting 
motion for summary judgment, the "motion for reconsideration" was, in essence, not a 
motion for reconsideration at all, but simply reargument of opposition to motion for 
summary judgment, which a trial court is free to entertain at any point prior to entry of a 
final order or judgment); U.P.C. Inc. v. R.O.A. General, Inc., 990 P.2d 945, 958-959 
(Utah App. 1999) ( motion to reconsider appropriate where litigant seeks to show: 1) 
matter presented in different light; 2) there has been change in governing law; 3) the party 
offers new evidence; 4) manifest injustice will result if court does not reconsider ruling; 
5) a court needs to correct own errors; or 6) an issue was inadequately briefed when first 
contemplated by court), 
Therefore, despite the contentions of CCD otherwise, Millsap's additional affidavit 
was properly before the trial court, was considered in the trial court's ruling denying the 
motion to reconsider, and is now properly part of the record before this Court. 
Jx CCD waived any alleged right to refuse 
performance of the Amendment to the 
Operating Agreement. 
The Amendment to the Operating Agreement very clearly provides that Millsap's 
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membership rights were to be reinstated upon completion of three conditions 
precedent: the repayment of the Newman Loan; the one year passage of time; and no 
further amendments to the Operating Agreement. See R. 221, <|j C; R. 522-528. See also 
CCD Brief at 6 (acknowledging that the parties agreed "that if Millsap timely repaid the 
Newman Loan, and the Operating agreement was not thereafter modified within a year 
after repayment of the loan . . . the terms of the Operating Agreement shall thereafter be 
binding upon the parties"); CCD Brief at 22 (noting the three conditions that were 
required). There has been no argument by CCD that these three conditions precedent 
were not met. 
Instead, CCD argues that other provisions of the Amendment were material, 
including the agreement that Millsap had no authority to sign checks and withdraw funds 
from CCD's trust account. See CCD Brief at 22, 27.8 CCD then reasons that Millsap's 
continued check writing and use of the trust account constitute "material" breaches of the 
Amendment. See CCD Brief at 21-23, 28-29; 43-45. Millsap makes the following 
responses. 
First, as noted before the district court and in the initial Brief of the Appellant, the 
realities of the business required Millsap to write hundreds of checks from the trust 
8CCD also asserts that it reserved any claims it had against Millsap in law or 
equity. See CCD Brief at 22. However, even though the right may have been "reserved," 
a party cannot enter a new contract which, if fulfilled, will purportedly satisfy an 
obligation, and then, once that obligation has been met, seek, as in this case, expulsion. 
While CCD and its Members may have attempted to reserve such right, CCD and its 
Members must still seek enforcement of such right in a timely manner. 
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account for legitimate business purposes after the Amendment was signed. All checks 
were written with the complete knowledge and approval of his partners. See R. 478, ^  11; 
R. 488-489; R. 525-526; 531-532. CCD and its Members cannot allow and authorize an 
action and then later complain that it constitutes breach. 
Second, Millsap has admitted to wrongfully writing two additional checks for his 
personal use which were made known to the Members immediately, the funds were 
immediately repaid, and Millsap was consequently terminated as an employee.9 Despite 
CCD's contention that it was unaware of such use, CCD itself recognizes its knowledge. 
See CCD Brief at 14-15 (noting that Newman investigated and then terminated Millsap); 
id. at 30 (admitting knowledge of Millsap's acts). Importantly, after discovering the two 
instances of misuse after the Amendment was signed, CCD and its Members continued to 
act according to the terms of the Amendment. Rather than terminating Millsap as an 
employee as they did, CCD and its Members could have moved to expel Millsap at that 
time. Additionally, CCD and its Members could have easily further amended the 
Operating Agreement, which was a material condition to the Amendment, in order to 
terminate Millsap's rights. None of this occurred. CCD continually glosses over the fact 
that not until at least a year went by and not until Millsap fulfilled all the material 
conditions precedent necessary for Millsap to regain his rights, did CCD seek expulsion. 
This Court should find that such untimely action on the part of CCD waived any assumed 
9The termination of Millsap as an employee did not affect his status as a 
"member." 
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right to refuse performance of the Amendment or right to expel. 
Finally, CCD fails to distinguish the difference between the clear "conditions 
precedent" of the Amendment which, if met, allowed Millsap to regain his rights of 
membership, and certain promises included within the Amendment that were arguably 
either disregarded by all parties involved or not kept. As noted in the initial Brief of 
Appellant, "A promise is a manifestation of an intention to act or refrain from acting in a 
specified way, so made as to justify the promisee in understanding that a commitment has 
been made, while a condition is an event, not certain to occur, which must occur... 
before performance under a contract becomes due." See Brief of Appellant at 38, n.22 
(citing 13 Samuel Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 38:5 (4th ed. 2000), at 
382) (emphasis added). The difference in the legal effect of the two concepts is 
important. Indeed, when "conditions precedent" have been fulfilled, then the opposing 
party is required to act accordingly. See id. Failure to uphold a "promise," on the other 
hand, may subject the promisor to liability for damages, but performance under the 
contract is not necessarily excused. See id. In this case, CCD never asserts that Millsap 
failed to meet the three conditions precedent required of him to regain his rights-
including his right to retire. This Court should therefore not allow CCD to refuse 
performance of the Amendment.10 
l0According to plain language of the four corners of the contract, the only three 
conditions for Millsap to meet in order to regain his memberships rights did not include 
the check-writing provision. As noted in prior briefing, the main purpose of the contract 
was secure repayment of the misused funds in an expedited manner. That goal was 
accomplished. However, if this Court looks beyond the clear words of the contract, and 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing and the argument and authority set forth in the initial Brief 
of Appellant, this Court should find that Millsap properly retired as a Member of CCD. 
As such, this Court should find that based on this retirement, Millsap was no longer a 
"member" of CCD as contemplated by statute, and therefore as a matter of law, may not 
be judicially expelled. 
DATED this / day of October 2002. 
JAMES C. BRADSHAW 
ANN MARIE TALIAFERRO 
Attorneys for Appellant Millsap 
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attempts to determine the intent of the parties in drafting the check writing provision and 
its "materiality," then the issue raises disputed issues of material fact which makes 
summary judgment inappropriate. 
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